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India and Pakistan Prepare for a More Dangerous Next Conflict Below the Nuclear Threshold

After the May 2025 crisis, both sides are racing to acquire faster, farther-reaching strike capabilities, convinced that intense conventional warfare will not trigger nuclear escalation.

5 min
India and Pakistan Prepare for a More Dangerous Next Conflict Below the Nuclear Threshold
After the May 2025 crisis, both sides are racing to acquire faster, farther-reaching strike capabilities, convinced thatCredit · Foreign Affairs

Key facts

  • The May 2025 crisis lasted four days with cross-border fire using drones, missiles, and artillery hitting military bases and urban centers.
  • A terrorist attack on April 22, 2025, in Pahalgam Valley killed 25 Indian citizens and one Nepali national.
  • India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, closed the Attari-Wagah border crossing, expelled Pakistani military advisers, and canceled visas.
  • Pakistan launched approximately 600 drone attacks over 72 hours during Operation Sindoor.
  • Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a 'new normal' of striking 'precisely and decisively' and rejecting nuclear blackmail.
  • Pakistan’s military threatened to 'shatter the myth of geographic immunity, hitting the farthest reaches of the Indian territory.'

The May 2025 Crisis: A New Kind of Conflict

The four-day war in May 2025 between India and Pakistan was the most serious conventional fighting between two nuclear-armed states in decades. It began after a terrorist attack on April 22 in Indian-administered Kashmir’s Pahalgam Valley, where gunmen killed 25 Indian citizens and one Nepali national, targeting them for their Hindu faith. Videos of the attack spread on social media, prompting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to threaten to pursue the perpetrators 'to the ends of the earth' and promise 'a punishment bigger than they can imagine.' India blamed Pakistan for the attack and enacted a series of punitive diplomatic measures, including suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, closing the Attari-Wagah border crossing, expelling Pakistani military advisers, and canceling visas. The ensuing conflict saw drones, missiles, and artillery strike an unprecedented number of sensitive targets, including military bases and urban centers, marking a significant expansion of conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold.

Lessons Learned: Faster, Farther, and in Greater Volume

Far from being chastened by the scale of the fighting, military planners in both India and Pakistan have spent the last year drawing lessons on how to inflict greater damage. Both sides have concluded that the next major clash will turn on their ability to strike faster, farther, and in greater volume than before. They are acquiring new capabilities, expanding domestic development programs, and enacting major structural reforms to improve the speed and coordination of their forces. Pakistan’s approach is asymmetric: it aims to avoid decisive engagements, impose persistent costs, and exploit escalation limits. During Operation Sindoor, Pakistan’s air force cocooned itself in hardened shelters after initial counter-air operations, then switched to drone swarms launching approximately 600 attacks over 72 hours. However, Pakistan’s execution was poor, and it lacked missile power and quality drones. In the next round, Pakistan plans to upgrade its fighter aircraft with long-range air-to-air missiles, thicken its air defense, acquire better missiles and drones, harden its defense infrastructure, and adopt subterranean warfare.

Targeting Cities and Critical Infrastructure

Pakistan’s asymmetric strategy will deliberately target major cities for psychological and political impact, daring India to lose its moral high ground by replicating the same. It will also target critical infrastructure such as power grids, oil refineries, petroleum depots, transport hubs, and communications networks to disrupt daily life. In conjunction with China, Pakistan could launch cyber attacks on economic and financial networks, including banks, digital payment systems, and stock exchanges, aiming for temporary paralysis with disproportionate effect. Pakistan has waged a terrorism-driven proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and major Indian cities since 1990, traditionally using AK-47s, grenades, and improvised explosive devices. Now, these terrorists are likely to be armed with drones, which are cheaper than an AK-47, enabling attacks on military, civilian, economic, infrastructure, and leadership targets from the rear.

The Maritime and Cyber Domains

The maritime domain offers another arena for asymmetric warfare. Rival navies will fight for sea control or denial, but asymmetric operations may extend to targeting commercial ships and tankers using drones and missiles. Harbors used by commercial ships can be mined. A 'mosquito navy' could play a big role in sea denial for commercial shipping up to 500-600 kilometers, with range extended by refueling. Cyber attacks, potentially coordinated with China, could target India’s economic and financial networks, including banks, digital payment systems, and stock exchanges. The aim is not destruction but temporary paralysis with disproportionate effect, compounding the disruption caused by kinetic strikes.

The Nuclear Shadow and Escalation Risks

Despite their confidence and bluster, the continued risk of escalation in a region home to a quarter of the world’s population should not be underestimated. Both sides appear increasingly convinced that more intense conventional fighting would not risk nuclear escalation. Shortly after the May crisis, Modi announced a 'new normal' in which India would 'strike precisely and decisively' and 'not tolerate any nuclear blackmail.' In response to Indian Army Chief Upendra Dwivedi’s warning that Pakistan should avoid provocations if it wants to 'remain on the world map,' Pakistan’s military threatened to 'shatter the myth of geographic immunity, hitting the farthest reaches of the Indian territory.' However, even if precision-strike warfare makes the deliberate use of nuclear weapons less likely than in a ground combat scenario, the introduction of novel systems, targets, and domains increases the risk of inadvertent nuclear use. India and Pakistan climbed new rungs of the escalation ladder in the last conflict without serious repercussions, emerging both more determined to exact meaningful costs on the battlefield and more confident in their ability to do so.

Washington’s Dilemma and the Path Forward

U.S. President Donald Trump has claimed credit for ending the May 2025 conflict, declaring in his 2026 State of the Union address that but for U.S. efforts, the conflict 'would have been a nuclear war.' His comments rankled New Delhi, which insists its disputes with Pakistan are purely bilateral. Yet Trump had a point: the crisis was the most serious fighting between two nuclear powers in decades. Washington’s traditional role in facilitating de-escalation will remain critical, but Trump’s comments will make mediation more difficult. To prevent backlash in India from stopping crucial diplomatic outreach, the United States and its partners must prepare for a future crisis that looks nothing like the last. Developing and testing a playbook for rapid decision-making, while supporting quiet channels of substantive engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad, could help prevent the next spark from becoming a true conflagration. The next crisis is likely to prove more dangerous, more destructive, and more difficult for Washington to manage.

The bottom line

  • The May 2025 crisis expanded conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold, with drones, missiles, and artillery hitting sensitive targets.
  • Both India and Pakistan are acquiring faster, longer-range capabilities and reforming military structures for rapid, coordinated strikes.
  • Pakistan’s asymmetric strategy will target cities, critical infrastructure, and use drones and cyber attacks to impose costs without triggering nuclear escalation.
  • The risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation increases with the introduction of novel systems and domains, despite confidence that conventional war can remain limited.
  • U.S. mediation efforts are complicated by Indian resistance to outside intervention and Trump’s public claims, requiring a new playbook for crisis management.
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